This paper investigates how the possibility to ostracise, which is a familiar punishment mechanism to subjects in an experiment, a¤ects harvest in a common pool resource experiment. The experiment was framed as a …shing problem and the subjects were young …shers in Ghana. We …nd that the introduction of the possibility to ostracise other members of a group at a cost to the remaining members of a group decreased over-…shing signi…cantly in comparison with the situation where ostracism was not possible. The ostracism was based on at least 50-percent voting rule. Moreover, the subjects demonstrated a strong desire to ostracise those who over-…shed.
Introduction
It is well-known that natural resources, such as …sh stocks, grazing lands, and forest stocks are generally managed as common pool resources in developing countries. However, common pool resources, if not properly managed, could be over-exploited, a situation referred to as "the tragedy of the commons"in Hardin (1968) . Several ways to overcome this problem have been discussed in the literature. For example, Dietz et al. (2003) discussed restriction of access which, according to Hardin (1968) , could either occur through privatising an unregulated common pool resource or keeping it as a public property but restricting the right to entry, and/or creating incentives to mitigate overuse of the resource. In many developing countries, including Ghana, formal institutions responsible for regulating the appropriation of environmental resources are generally very weak, hence the drive towards a policy of devolution of responsibility and control over natural resources from government agencies to resource users (Ostrom, 1990; Meinzen et al., 2002) .
In most cases, social norms may complement or substitute formal institutions. It is known that rules and social norms impact behaviour and attitude towards the use of natural resources. Although, as argued by Bowles (1998) , markets and other economic institutions in ‡uence the evolution of human values, the threat of social sanctions may make it rational, from the cost-bene…t viewpoint, to abide by norm-guided behaviours (Jon, 1989) . This paper therefore investigates the e¤ect of 1 ostracism or social exclusion, which is a familiar punishment mechanism to subjects in an experiment, and common in developing countries, in the appropriation of a common pool …shery. As noted by Ho¤man and Goldsmith (2004) , ostracism is continuously operating in every set of human relations in all cultures.
Evidently, social dilemma experiments in a laboratory setting, without any form of formal or informal institutions, or communication among the members, have generally found over-exploitation at levels close to what is predicted for complete rational self-interestedness (see e.g. Walker et al., 1990; Cardinas, 2003; Casari and Plott, 2003) . Recent experimental studies on common pool resources and public goods have focused on the e¤ect of allowing di¤erent methods of punishment among members in a group. Ostrom et al. (1992) and Cardenas et al. (2000) found that cooperation and average earnings increase if monetary sanctioning is available in a common pool resource experiment. Similarly, monetary punishment in a public good experiment introduced by Fehr and Gächter (2000) , resulted in a signi…cant increase in the contribution to a public good, although it was costly to the punisher. 1 2 Although ostracism or social exclusion is a common social sanction in developing countries, only a small number of studies have employed ostracism as a treatment in social dilemma experiments (e.g. Masclet, 2003; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005) to investment its impact on free-rider behaviour. Masclet (2003) designed a linear public good experiment that had two stages in each period and a subject could only be ostracised from the second stage activity in each period. Two treatments were considered: costly ostracism (which was enforceable if at least one member voted for ostracism) to any subject who voted to ostracise, and costless ostracism. It was found that the possibility of exclusion from the second public good experiment increased average contributions to the …rst public good. Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) introduced ostracism based on at least 50-percent voting in a public good experiment. A cost was imposed on those who voted to ostracise, if and only if the subject who received the votes was ostracised. The ostracised members were then reassigned and given only half of their previous endowment to the same public good experiment. Their results show an almost maximal level of contribution to the public good among the non-excluded members. 3 4 5 This paper reports results from a common pool resource experiment among young …shers in a developing country where ostracism is a familiar punishment mechanism. 6 In particular, we study the impact of ostracism, which is an existing punishment mechanism, on levels of harvest 7 . The 1 Similar results have been found in other public good experiments on students (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1992; and Bochet et al., 2006) . Gächter et al. (2004) found that some de…nitions of trust have a signi…cant impact on contribution in a public good experiment in Russia. Carpenter et al. (2004) had similar …ndings in their experiments in Vietnam and Thailand. 2 Other institutions include e.g. introduction of the possibility of communicating disapproval in a public good experiment as a form of non-monetary punishment (see Masclet et al., 2003) . The results of Masclet et al. (2003) , for example, indicated a higher level of contribution to the public good after its introduction, but the positive e¤ect on cooperation from the possibility of non-monetary punishment declined over time in their experiment. In a common pool experiment, Ostrom et al. (1992) found that by allowing face-to-face communication within groups, average net yield increased compared to the baseline situation where no communication was allowed. 3 Interestingly, the e¤ects on net earnings are positive and signi…cant, which is uncommon in public goods experiments with monetary punishment. Masclet (2003) and Soest and Vyrastekova (2004) conducted an experiment with a one-period ostracism from a second activity in that period. In the former case, a public good experiment was followed by a second public good experiment in each period, while in the latter case a common pool resource experiment was followed by a gift exchange. 4 Baland and Platteau (2000) noted that ostracism will result in cooperation, i.e. adopting the social optimum strategy, if the voting is based on a majority rule and if the decision to ostracise is irrevocable. A similar argument is found in Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) where a prisoner's dilemma game was solved recursively. 5 Cardenas et al. (2000) found that when people get used to imperfect monitoring, they rapidly move towards self-interested choices. 6 Murphy and Cardenas (2004) present an excellent introduction on how to conduct a common pool resource experiment. Furthermore, some examples of experiments with subjects who face social dilemmas in resource extraction in their daily lives include Cardenas (2003) ; Carpenter and Seki (2005) ; and Gaspart and Seki (2003) . There are several studies that compare student with non-student subjects. Other studies that compare the two groups of subjects in public good experiment include Carpenter et al. (2004) and List (2004) . 7 Ostracism as a punishment mechanism exists in all rural communities in Ghana and is usually applied as the last 2 paper combines the features of the work of Masclet (2003) and Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) . To mimic the reality, it is assumed that the ostracism applies to the single activity, i.e. the …shing, and it is permanent. Moreover, the experiment involves real subjects in a developing country where ostracism is a familiar punishment mechanism. The results from our experiment show that without the possibility to ostracise, over-…shing is substantial. When ostracism was introduced, subjects were ostracised although it was costly for the remaining members to ostracise a member. Moreover, as a result of the introduction of ostracism, there was a sharp decline in over-…shing compared to a baseline treatment in which it was not possible to ostracise. The results from our experiment can be viewed in the light of the fact that, in the absence of external sanctions, internalized norms may not be su¢ cient in regulating resource appropriation. Consequently, for example, a …shing licensing system with decentralised monitoring which makes it possible to withdraw the license upon violation might be a feasible policy tool to regulate over-…shing. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In the next section, we introduce our speci…c experimental design, and the organisation of the experiment is in section 3. The results of the experiment are presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes the paper.
Experimental design
In our experiment, each group consists of 8 members and the total endowment of time for labour activities in a period is set to 8, which is framed as 8 months in a year to mimic the maximum number of months a …sher could …sh within a year. 8 Member ican allocate the total time available to him/her to …shing, which is denoted x i , and other activities, which correspond to 8 x i . We assume that there is no alternative work option for the …shers and this resembles the common situation in most …shing villages in Ghana. Following the literature on common pool resource, we assume that the aggregated production function is "hump-shaped" and this is speci…ed as a twopiece linear production function (e.g. Dasgupta 
The pay-o¤ to member i does not only depend on how many months he/she had …shed, but also the total amount of months that the other group members had …shed.
The aggregated social optimum level is 24 months, which corresponds to a symmetric social optimal level of 3 months per year for each member. Without any social sanction, the self-interested …sher will do what is best for him by …shing for more months than the social optimal number of months. Based on equation (E2), we constructed the payo¤ matrix that was handed out to the subjects in the experiment (see Appendix I). In the pay-o¤ matrix, the columns indicate the number of months a given member …shed, while the rows show the total number of months the rest of the members …shed. All possible combinations of the earnings from …shing for member i can be read from the matrix. The exchange rate used for the payment in the experiment was 35 Cedis for 1 experimental currency unit. 9 If each member spends the social optimum amount of time of 3 months, the payo¤ for each equals to 624 Cedis. resort when any social norm is violated, e.g. stealing, …ghting, adultery, etc. 8 In all …shing communities in Ghana, …shing is strictly prohibited one day per week. The day varies across communities. Moreover, …shing does not normally take place on Sundays since most …shers go to church, mend their nets or attend social gatherings, such as marriage ceremonies and funerals. Thus, on average, a …sher goes …shing about …ve days in a week and this approximately adds up to 8 months in a year, as in our experiment. 9 35 Cedis is the Ghanaian currency equivalent to US$0.036 at the time of the experiment. From personal enquiry at the time of the experiment, the average earning of a …sher within Anyako (the area where the experiment was The common pool resource experiment is run for 30 periods and we use two di¤erent treatments in the experiment, following a similar set up in Cardenas et al. (2000) . In both treatments, the …rst 15 periods consisted of an ordinary common pool resource experiment after which there was a break. After the break, the experiment continued for another 15 periods, and this was known at the beginning of the experiment. Half of the sample continued with the ordinary common pool resource experiment, while ostracism was introduced in the other half. Theoretically, for any common pool resource problem with a large number of potential users, if a member of the group is ostracised, average earnings for the aggregate social optimum number of months will increase for the remaining members of the group. However, in real life …shery, members in a group interact in many ways that enhance mutual bene…ts. For example, …shermen in Ghana collectively help each other to retrieve lost or entangled nets at sea, haul the …shing boats, carry and dry …shing nets after landing and serve as watchdogs in protecting …shing equipment from theft, which are activities that bene…t a larger group. Thus ostracising a member will have a negative e¤ect on the remaining group members in the mentioned contexts. The size of these e¤ects may however vary across the …shers, but we assume in our experiment that these e¤ects, which are expressed as costs, are the same across all the remaining members in the group. To account for this loss, a cost was introduced in the experiment. Moreover, the cost is set such that irrespective of the number of months a …sher …shes, it would always be costly to ostracise a member. The cost was calculated by comparing the payo¤s in two di¤erent situations. In one situation, all …shers except one …shed for the social optimal number of months while the deviating …sher …shed for the maximum possible months. This was compared to another situation where the deviating member had been ostracised, and the group only consisted of members …shing at the social optimal level. For example, if all but one member …shed at the social optimal number of months, i.e. 3 months, while the remaining subject …shes for 8 months, the payo¤ to each member …shing 3 months is 54.1. In the situation with 7 subjects, i.e. in a situation where the deviating member has been ostracised, the payo¤ is 78 each. The di¤erence between the two payo¤s is 24, and to make exclusion costly for the remaining members, we added a cost of 3 to make the cost equal to 27, which implies that the net payo¤ to each of the remaining subjects is 51 (i.e. 78-27). 10 If a cost is imposed on the remaining members, member i's return presented in equation (E2) would then be modi…ed to
where j is the cost of having j members ostracised. Thus, the catch rate per se is not a¤ected, but losses occur for other reasons as discussed above, and this results in a lower net return. In our experiment, each member had the opportunity to vote to ostracise another member from his/her group at the end of each period. Based on at least 50-percent voting, it was decided whether a member was to be ostracised for a life time. In such a case, that member would not earn any money in the subsequent periods of the experiment. This mimics the fact that if a …sher is ostracised from a community, he/she no longer gets any income from the …shing activity and may also …nd it di¢ cult to secure an alternative viable economic activity. The number of votes required to ostracise a member and the cost of ostracism imposed on the remaining members are presented in Table A2 in Appendix II.
conducted) was about 70,000 Cedis (7.87 USD) per day and the length of a …shing day was on average 6 hours. This was higher than the average earning of 40,233.30 Cedis (4.50 USD) in the experiment. However, the hourly wages are approximately the same between …shing and taking part in the experiment. These levels had been set based on a pilot experiment in May 2004. 1 0 Similarly, if the group consists of 7 subjects and a subject is ostracised, the remaining 6 subjects will get an average payo¤ of 104 if each invests the social optimal level of e¤ort of, in this case, 4 months. To make the exclusion costly, we added 3 to the di¤erence between 104 and 51, thus making the cost of exclusion equal to 56. Following the same procedure, 3 was added to the cost if an additional individual is excluded.
Organisation of the experiment
The experiment was conducted in Anyako, a …shing community in the Volta region, which is one of ten administrative regions of Ghana. The region is rich in freshwater …sh, such as tilapia, but intense …shing activities has led to over-exploitation of many of the species. Anyako is located in the Keta Lagoon basin in the southern part of the Volta region, where occupation possibilities, except for occupations related to …shing, are very limited. Normally, the men in …shing communities in Ghana are involved directly in …shing and maintenance of the boats, and …shing equipment, while the women prepare and sell the catch (Walker, 2002) . Although it is generally taboo for women to go …shing in many …shing communities in Ghana, some of them are indirectly involved in …shing by owning …shing boats and nets, which are operated by men on a share-contract basis. Thus, after the variable cost of the …shing expedition is deducted, a proportion of the revenue from the catch, usually a half, goes to the crew and the other half to the owner of the …shing gear. Moreover, some women also give loans to male …shers in order to support their …shing activities. In Ghana, due to a limited budget from government, the state institutions that are responsible for governing common pool resources are generally weak. Consequently, …shing regulations have been decentralised to the communities. 11 A chief …sherman oversees all …shing activities within a …shing community, 12 and this gives him the power to implement traditional …shing laws, resolve …shing-related con ‡icts and punish violators of the …shing laws. His decisions are made in consultation with his council of elders, which usually consists of the head of each clan within the community. Once the chief …sherman takes a decision, it is binding on all …shers within his community. The …shing laws, which operate at community-level, do not di¤er much across communities. For example, they include prohibition of …shing on o¤-…shing days, which is usually one day in a week, and the use of destructive …shing techniques and equipment such as dynamite, cyanide and/or DDT. The punishment for not obeying the laws, which is decided by the chief …sherman, ranges from oral disapproval to life-time ostracism depending on which law is violated. For example, whilst using child labour during school hours may receive oral disapproval, …shing with poisons could receive ostracism as a punishment. Ostracism is employed either as a direct sanction when some traditional …shing law is not obeyed or when a …sherman fails to pay a …ne imposed. There are, however, some di¤erences regarding the structure of punishment across communities.
Our sample is from students at the Anyako Secondary School, which is the highest institution for formal education within the area, and is attended by teenagers and young adults from the area. A week before the experiment, a pre-experimental questionnaire was administered to 168 of the …rst to third year Senior Secondary School students who volunteered to answer the questions. This constituted slightly less than 70% of the 244 students enrolled at the school. All the students had been informed a week before we conducted the pre-experimental questionnaire about this event at a general meeting. One of the purposes of the pre-experimental questionnaire was to identify the sample for the common pool resource experiment, which should only consist of individuals who were currently involved in …shing activities. The respondents were asked a set of background questions, mainly relating to personal characteristics and …shing experience. At the end, the subjects were also asked whether they would be willing to participate in an "economic choice decision", which was to take place a week later. Each subject was given two versions of the questionnaire, one in Ewe 13 and one in English. The questionnaire was developed in English and later translated into Ewe by one translator and another translator did the reverse translation. Afterwards the translators met and discussed any di¤erences that have occurred, and agreed on the …nal wording. From the 168 subjects who took part in the pre-experimental questionnaire, we randomly selected 128 subjects who had some …shing experience. The average age of the students was 18.5 years. We conducted the experiment on a weekday to reduce the potential problem of individuals not showing up. Moreover, in order to encourage the subjects to attend, we asked the headmaster to announce the names of those that had been selected to participate at a gathering of all the students of the school.
On the day of the common pool resource experiment, the identities of the randomly selected subjects were checked against the list of names, and each subject was then given a numbered card outside the room. These numbers assigned them to a pre-marked seat. The numbered cards were also used to assign the subjects to the two treatments (i.e. the baseline and ostracism treatment). Each treatment consisted of eight groups. The venue for the experiment was two halls, one for each treatment group. The subjects took their seats at numbered but otherwise empty desks with enough space between the desks to guarantee privacy when making their decisions. They were informed that they were about to make "economic choice decisions", and that the amount that each subject would earn would depend on their own decisions as well as on the decisions made by the other subjects in their group.
They then received the instructions of the game and the payo¤ matrix (see Appendix I). Moreover, each subject was given 30 experimental cards, i.e. one card per period, to be handed to the instructor indicating how many months they …shed during a speci…c period, or year as framed in the experiment. All 30 experimental cards were delivered before the experiment began to avoid a re-start e¤ect in period 16, i.e. the break motivated for resting and where we also introduced ostracism treatment for half of the groups. Finally, the subjects were given one record sheet on which they recorded the number of months that all the other members of their group …shed. This information was written down on a sheet of paper and handed out by an instructor to each member of a group after each round. This approach was chosen to avoid any e¤ect from a di¤erent degree of recall on behaviour. The subjects were then given some time to read the instructions, and thereafter the instructor read the instructions aloud, …rst in English and then in Ewe to all the subjects. The subjects then answered six exercises in a language of their choice to test their understanding of the payo¤ matrix. The correct solutions, as well as how to obtain them from the payo¤ matrix, were explained orally and also written down on the chalkboard. Half of the sample, i.e. 64 subjects, sat in each of the two halls.
In the experiment, we used partner matching but the subject remained anonymous to other members in his/her group. In our case, it is natural to let the subjects remain in the same group to replicate living in a community. The procedure during one period in the experiment was as follows: the subjects …rst decided on how many months to spend on …shing, which was written down on the experimental cards for that speci…c period. These cards were then collected by one of the instructors. The contributions and earnings were computed manually, and then written down on a sheet of paper and handed to the members of each group, but no additional information was provided. After the …fteenth period, there was a break, which had been announced before the experiment began, giving the subjects the opportunity to rest and to introduce the ostracism in half of the group. It was stated in the instructions that they were not allowed to talk to each other during the experiment, which also applied during the break, and the instructors were instructed to ensure that during the break the subjects obeyed this rule.
In the ostracism treatment, the subjects were given information about the rules of ostracism at the end of the break. They were informed that they had the opportunity to vote out a member from their group. In order to be able to execute the selection, each subject was given 15 voting cards. Each subject had the opportunity to vote after the information on the total and individual months of …shing was handed out to him or her. The information was provided in the same way as in the non-ostracism treatment during the …rst 15 periods, and in the baseline treatment after period 15. The voting cards were then collected by one of the instructors, and if a subject refrained from voting, an "X" was entered on the card. Each member was then given a written feedback on the number of votes he/she received in that period after which the experiment continued to the next period. If an individual received the minimum number or more votes required for ostracism, he/she 6 was orally informed by an instructor to leave the room.
14 It was stressed that anyone could refrain from voting if he/she desired to do so. If a subject was voted out, he/she would not continue to take part in the experiment and thus would not have the possibility to earn any money from the subsequent periods of the experiment. The decision to ostracise an individual was based on at least 50-percent voting as presented in Table A2 . In total, the experiment lasted for 5 hours, consisting of the …rst two hours for the ordinary CPR, and then a 15-minute break, and …nally two hours and forty-…ve minutes for the treated section.
All subjects were paid the following day. Their earnings were calculated and the amounts were put in an envelope, which was sealed and the subject's identi…cation number was written on it. The envelopes were then placed on a table in an unused classroom to be collected by the subjects. Each subject entered the room through one door and left through another door. When the subject entered the room, he/she showed his/her numbered identi…cation card from the experiment of the day before, to an instructor who did not assist during the common pool resource experiment. The instructor was sitting at a nearby table ensuring that the right envelope was collected. Figure 1 presents the time paths of the average time spent …shing in the two treatments. The …gure shows no signi…cant di¤erence between the two treatments during the …rst …fteen periods. However, after ostracism was introduced, the time spent …shing declined sharply towards the social optimum number of months compared to the baseline treatment. In both treatments, the time spent …shing started from a level slightly above the social optimum of 24 during the …rst periods and increased over time in the experiment. The over-…shing increased over time and approached the Nash optimum of 6 months.
Results
[Insert Figure 1 about here] Using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average time spent on …shing in the two treatments is the same during the …rst …fteen periods at 5% signi…cance level. After the introduction of ostracism, the time spent …shing decreased in these groups to a level slightly above the social optimum number of months but statistically lower than the Nash equilibrium, while in the baseline treatment, the time spent …shing continues to slowly increase. 15 During the last …fteen periods, we can reject the null hypotheses that the two treatments are the same at 1% signi…cance level using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test, which indicates that the introduction of ostracism signi…cantly a¤ected the total time spent …shing. Figure 2 shows the proportion of subjects who voted in the ostracism treatment, and the cumulative proportion of ostracised members. As shown in the …gure, when the ostracism was introduced, 61% of the members voted in the …rst period to exclude another member in their group although exclusion was costly to the remaining members in the subsequent periods. Three subjects were ostracised in the …rst period, and an additional two subjects during the following 14 periods. It should be noted that the subjects gained some experience with the common pool experiment since they had taken part in the …rst 15 periods.
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 1 4 The pilot experiment indicated that ostracism would most likely to happen in the …rst period and this would have resulted in letting ostracised subjects sit and wait for 2.5 hours. By keeping the ostracised members waiting, there is a high possibility that they would be tempted to communicate with other subjects in the experiment. As a result, we decided to let the ostracised members leave the hall. 1 5 The average was computed as the total e¤ort per group divided by eight even if some member(s) had already been ostracised from the group. This approach is applied to make the results comparable between the baseline and the ostracism treatment. This is because while the individual optimal level of …shing has changed, the total social optimum level of …shing remains the same.
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The pattern of the graph showing the proportion of subjects who voted over time reveals some inter-temporal dependency or an autoregressive process. Thus, over time, the proportion of subjects who casted their votes to exclude miscreants from the game decreased because overharvesting diminished as e¤ort levels got closer to the social optimum. This indicates that voting is not random but motivated by the extent of overharvesting. A simple ordinary least square regression analysis, where the proportion of the subjects who voted was regressed on a one period lag is reported in Table 1 . From the results, there exists a strong indication that the voting follows a …rst order autoregressive process. On average, the proportion of votes in a period is approximately one-half the proportion in the previous period.
[Insert Table 1 about here] Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between the number of votes received and e¤ort applied in the …shery in excess of the group average; and the determinants of the changes in the number of months of …shing in the ostracism treatment. The determinants include: the level of trust that the subject has in other students (rated on a 1-5 scale, with 1 being the highest); the number of local associations or clubs that the subject belongs (denoted membership in our regression); if the subject in reality …shes less than 21 days in a month (denoted low …shing intensity in our regression); whether the subject has ever been caught violating a …shing regulation or not (denoted violated …shing law in our regression); and the gender of the subject. The descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 about here]
In Table 3 , the number of votes received was regressed on positive deviation from group average, i.e. the amount of e¤ort the individual applied in the …shing activity in excess of the average e¤ort of his/her group:As expected, positive deviation has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on votes received. The coe¢ cient indicates that if an individual on the average applied a unit of e¤ort in excess of his/her group average, approximately one individual within his/her group voted against him/her 16 . Note that since the maximum number of votes that a subject could receive in each round is 8 and the minimum is zero, the regression is estimated as a panel Tobit model. The results presented in Table 4 show that in the ostracism treatment, the only signi…cant e¤ect on the change in months of …shing was whether a subject, on average, received a vote or not.
[Insert Table 3 about here] [Insert Table 4 about here]
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we …nd evidence that the introduction of ostracism a¤ects the amount of time spent on …shing in a common pool resource experiment, which is framed as a …shery problem among young …shers in a …shing community in Ghana. The …shery sector in Ghana is currently characterized by over-…shing, weak formal institutions to regulate harvest, and a decentralized decision-making process where the chief …sherman acts both as the maker of traditional …shing laws and enforcer of the laws.
Our experiment shows that the introduction of the possibility to ostracise a members of a group, based on a simple at least 50-percent voting rule, decreased over-…shing signi…cantly. Although it was costly for non-ostracised members to ostracise a member, ostracism still took place. This …nding is in line with work by, for example, Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) where subjects punished others although the punishment was at a cost to the punisher. Interestingly, of the 1 6 We also estimated the model with a binary dependent variable of whether the individual received a vote or not but the regression had a lower explanatory power relative to the case where the dependent variable is continuous. 8 5 members who were ostracised, 3 were ostracised in the …rst period of the ostracism treatment. From the voting pattern in the experiment, by implication, two-thirds of the subjects in our sample would always self-report violation of …shing laws. It is therefore likely that part of the problem related to over-…shing might be due to inadequate punishment of over-…shers, or in reality ostracising a member from the community does not often take place, or ostracised members quickly show remorse and are reaccepted into the community. This may imply that the social ties are stronger than the concern for over-…shing. In addition, in reality there is the chance that an individual who over…sh may get away with the crime and as a result may not be ostracised. This may lower the extent of compliance.
From a policy perspective, ostracism in our experiment could be permanent withdrawal of community-based …shing licensing if a …sher violates a …shing law that is endogenously monitored. Fishing licenses exist in many developing countries in Africa and Asia. However, at the heart of the e¤ectiveness of enforcement of …shing regulations with endogenous institutions is the availability of adequate and reliable data on …sh stocks and harvest rates, which is taken for granted in our experimental settings. Note: The standard errors are in parentheses.*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Group dummies have been included in the regressions to control for group fixed effects.
TABLES AND FIGURES

Introduction
In this experiment you and seven others in this room will make a series of decisions on how many months to fish in a year. In any one year, you can fish up to a maximum of 8 months but the quantity of fish you harvest will depend on the number of months the other members of your group harvest from the fishery. In each round, which corresponds to a year of fishing, you will have to decide, and declare, how many months you will spend in the fishery.
The Payoff Table
At the start of the experiment, you will receive a PAYOFF TABLE that should be read the same way as the one attached at the end of these instructions. All participants will have the same payoff table as you. This table contains all the information that you need to make your decision for each year of fishing. The numbers that are in the table correspond to the ECU that you would earn in each year for a given set of decisions. Each of you must decide the number of MONTHS that you want to spend in the fishery (in the columns from 0 to 8).
To harvest in each round you must write the number of the current round and the number of months you have decided upon (this will be a number between 0 and 8) on an EXPERIMENTAL CARD that the instructor will give to you. There is an example attached at the end of the instructions.
After everyone has made his/her decision, the instructor will collect the EXPERIMENTAL CARDS from all 8 members of the group and will calculate the total number of months that the group decided to spend extracting from the fishery. When the instructor announces the group total, each of you will be able to calculate the ECU that you earned in that round. You will find an example below.
In this experiment, we assume that each individual has a maximum of 8 MONTHS each year to extract fish. On the PAYOFF TABLE, this corresponds to the columns from 0 to 8. Each of you must decide on the number of months, from 0 to 8, that you fish in each year. But to be able to know how much you earned in ECU, you need to know the decisions that the rest of the group made. Assuming that a TOTAL of 22 months were spent in the fishery, you know that "Their months in the fishery" was 20, and your earnings for the round are 53 ECU.
The First Record Sheet
OK, let us look at how the experiment works in each round (i.e. each year). Each participant will receive a FIRST RECORD SHEET like the one attached at the end of these instructions.
Using Example 1 above, let us see how to use this FIRST RECORD SHEET. Suppose that you decided to spend 2 months in the fishery this round. On the EXPERIMENTAL CARD, you should write 2 next to "My months in the fishery." You must also write this number in the first column (A) of the FIRST RECORD SHEET. (You must enter your decision in 3 places: the EXPERIMENTAL CARD that you give to the instructor, the FIRST RECORD SHEET and the SECOND RECORD SHEET both of which you hang onto …).
The instructor will collect the EXPERIMENTAL CARDS from everyone in your group and will calculate the total number of months spent in the fishery by the whole group. The instructor will give everyone in the group written feedback on the number of months that each ID number in your group spent in the fishery and the TOTAL number of months that your group spent in the fishery. Suppose that the total was 22 months. Write 22 in column B of the FIRST RECORD SHEET. To calculate "Their months in the fishery", subtract column A from column B, and record this in column C. In our example, "their months in the fishery" is 20. To calculate your earnings, use the payoff 
Second Record Sheet:
It is very important to understand that nobody will know what your decisions were in each year or what you have earned from the experiment because only your ID number will be used throughout. Written feedback on both the group total and the months spent in the fishery by each ID number in your group will be given to you at the end of each round by the instructor. Record the individual months and the group total on the SECOND RECORD SHEET below. The instructor will collect this record sheet at the end of the experiment. If you have any questions about how to earn money in the experiment, please ask before the experiment begins.
SECOND RECORD SHEET ID_______________________________ INDIVIDUAL NUMBER OF MONTHS (Please
Summary of Steps for Harvesting One Round of the Experiment
How it is Done: In each round, you must decide how many months, between 0 and 8, you want to devote in one year in extracting resources from a fishery. Your earnings in each round depend on both your decision and the decisions made by the other members of your group, according to the PAYOFF TABLE.
What you need: To take part, you need a PAYOFF TABLE, FIRST RECORD SHEET, SECOND RECORD SHEET, and EXPERIMENTAL CARDS. You also need an ID number. The instructor will provide all of these. 
Steps for Each
